This paper is an empirical analysis of the impact of ownership structure on bank profitability in Nigeria. We examine whether the composition and spread of bank ownership significantly impinges on bank returns. Using 98 commercial and merchant banks in 478 observations over the 1989-2004 period, regression and t-test results suggest that the composition and spread of ownership has had no significant effect on bank profitability in Nigeria. Hence, the current move by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to manipulate the composition of bank ownership in Nigeria is inappropriate.
I. -Introduction
Ownership structure is considered an important factor that affects a firm's health (Zeitun and Tian, 2007) . If ownership structure affects a firm's health, it is possible then to use the ownership structure to predict firm profitability. Against this backdrop, this paper analyzes the relationship between ownership structure and bank profitability in Nigeria. There are two motivations for this paper. Firstly, midway into the banks consolidation exercise in Nigeria (Okagbue and Aliko, 2005) , the CBN identified the need for a determination of the most appropriate composition of bank capitalization that would enhance the individual and systemic profitability and efficiency of banks in Nigeria post-consolidation. Hence, it decided to minimize state governments' investment in banks during the exercise (Ugwu, 2005) and also issued a December 2007 ultimatum to all tiers of governments that have stakes in banks to dilute their investments to a maximum of 10 per cent (Aminu and Elueme, 2005) .
Unfortunately, the CBN did not state any econometrically-based rationale giving credence to its directives. Secondly, the effect of ownership structure and concentration on a firm's performance is an important issue in the literature of finance theory (Zeitun and Tian, 2007) .
However, no researcher has studied this important aspect of finance theory in the Nigerian context. It is worth noting that most research on ownership structure and firm performance has been dominated by studies conducted in developed countries. However, there is an increasing awareness that theories originating from developed countries such as the USA and the UK may have limited applicability to emerging markets. Emerging markets have different characteristics such as different political, economic and institutional conditions, which limit the application of developed markets' empirical models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a conceptual framework of previous research relating to ownership structure and bank profitability.
Section 3 is a review of the ownership structure of banks in Nigeria. Section 4 presents the data used in the study. Section 5 presents the empirical estimations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. Conceptual Framework
The definition of what constitutes a foreign bank varies among different authors.
While Uche (1998) sees a bank as foreign if its head office is not situated in Nigeria, Anyanwaokoro (1996) sees a bank as expatriate or foreign if it is wholly (100 percent) owned by foreign investors. Claessens et al. (1998) consider a bank to be foreign owned if foreign residents own 50 percent or more of its capital. Crystal et al. (2002) consider banks to be foreign if foreign shareholders own a majority of voting shares or exercise effective management control. A sharp contrast from all preceding definitions, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) , within the context of their study, define a bank as foreign if it has more than 10 percent foreign ownership. Magri et al. (2004) isolate three distinct categories of foreign bank presence-subsidiaries, branches, and minority shareholdings. By 'subsidiary', they mean a bank which is legally autonomous but controlled (through the majority of votes) by a holding company located abroad, while a branch is a part of a foreign bank and has no legal autonomy.
While Anyanwaokoro (2001) (Sapienza, 2004) .
In fact, La Porta et al. (2002) show that, worldwide, there is a large, pervasive government ownership of banks.
Recent years have seen increased research into the relationship between ownership and bank profitability. Several studies have been conducted on the relative performance of foreign versus domestic banks. Studies of the relative performance of foreign versus domestic banks in industrial countries include DeYoung and Nolle (1996) , Berger et al. (2000) and Vander Vennet (1996) ; and studies focusing on developing countries (or both developing and industrial countries) include Bonin et al. (2004) and Clarke et al. (2000) . Most of these studies have argued that foreign banks are more profitable than their domestic counterparts in developing countries and less profitable than domestic banks in industrial countries. In a research study conducted by Goldberg et al. (2000) , foreign-owned banks, on the whole, tended to be "healthier" than their domestic counterparts. Comparing the 1995-2000 performance of foreign and domestic banks in select Latin American countries, they revealed that while foreign banks differed little from their domestic counterparts in overall financial condition, they showed more robust loan growth, a more aggressive response to asset quality deterioration, and a greater ability to absorb losses-characteristics that jointly portray that they are by far more profitable than domestic banks. Jeon et al. (2004) state that foreign banks are more likely to earn higher returns on assets and equity than domestic banks. Drawing similar conclusions, Micco et al. (2004) explain that foreign-owned banks tend to have much lower overhead costs. Also, higher rates of return among foreign banks reflect lower-cost operations and / or improved investment and lending practices that improve earnings. But, in industrial countries, foreign banks experience lower margins (measured either as a share of total assets or as a share of loans plus deposits) than their domestic counterparts.
There are several other plausible reasons for the enhanced profitability of foreign banks when compared to their domestic counterparts. Firstly, foreign banks enjoy technical advantages over domestic banks in their host territories. They enjoy economies of scale from operating in more than one country at a time. When interest rates in their home countries go higher than interest rates in their host countries, they simply reduce their lending activities in the host country and increase their lending activities in their home country and vice versa. This is why Jeon et al. (2004) state that: "foreign banks' lending is sensitive to changes in home-country conditions". In developing countries, foreign banks are frequently exempt from credit allocation regulations and other such restrictions; hence, they are able to realize high interest margins by lending without any restrictions to the most profitable sectors in the host country's economy. They also have more opportunities to transfer their funds abroad to expand their income base. Furthermore, they are better able to raise equity capital internationally than their domestic counterparts, and this often makes them to accept a lower net profitability (Claessens et al. 1998) . Finally, depositors consider these banks a safe haven due to high capitalization and access to foreign credit, thereby enhancing patronage and profits (Hull, 2002) .
Studies (e.g. Zeitun and Tian, 2007) have also been conducted on the relationship between ownership concentration (spread) and bank profitability. Based on the spread of ownership, banks could be classified as either quoted or non-quoted. The ownership structure of quoted banks is deconcentrated (diffused or well spread out), while the ownership structure of non-quoted banks is concentrated. Using data for all the more than 700 Czech firms that were consistently listed on the Prague Stock Exchange over the period 1992-95, the empirical evidence from Claessens et al. (1997) reveal that there are strong positive relationships between ownership concentration and profitability. They find that the more concentrated the ownership of a firm, the higher its profitability and market value. Mitton (2002) also shows that firms with high disclosure quality and ownership concentration showed better stock market performance during the Asian economic crisis. Ownership concentration may improve performance by decreasing monitoring costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . However, it may also work in the opposite direction (Leech and Leahy, 1991) . There is a possibility that large shareholders use their control rights to achieve private benefits (Zeitun and Tian, 2007) .
Studies have also been conducted on state versus private ownership of banks.
Empirical evidence from La Porta et al. (2002) and Micco et al. (2004) suggest that state-owned banks operating in developing countries tend to have lower profitability than their private counterparts and that this lower profitability is due to lower net interest margin, higher overhead costs (mostly due to the fact that state-owned banks tend to employ relatively more people), and higher non-performing loans. When they focus on industrial countries, they find that, relative to their private counterparts, state-owned banks tend to have slightly higher overhead costs but other performance variables (profitability, margins, and non-performing loans) do not vary significantly across these two groups of banks.
However, non-performing loans tend to be particularly high in state banks. This is especially the case in the Caribbean, industrial countries, Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Several other reasons have been given for the low profitability generally observed among most state-owned banks in the world. Sapienza (2004) states that state-owned banks charge lower interest rates than do privately owned banks to similar or identical firms. Clarke et al. (2004) state that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) experience poorer corporate governance than private firms; and this could be attributed to weak incentives for managers to perform effectively. SOEs managers do not face a market for their skills or a credible threat of losing their job for non-performance; and bankruptcy, liquidation or hostile takeover are not credible threats for state owned firms (Berglof and Roland, 1998; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Schmidt, 1996; Vickers and Yarrow, 1989; and Vickers and Yarrow, 1991) . Micco et al. (2004) attribute state banks' low profitability to the fact that, rather than maximizing profits, they respond to a social mandate. Since state banks are owned by the government, they often align themselves with government policies even when these policies significantly diminish their profit margins. Pedersen and Thompson (1997) and Zeitun and Tian (2007) have asserted that ownership structure has impacts on a firm's performance and its default risk. However, there is need to emphasize that the empirical studies of the relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration and structure have produced mixed results. For example, Demestz and Lehn (1985) find no effect of ownership structure on accounting profits. On the other hand, Leech and Leahy (1991) find a negative and significant relationship between ownership concentration and firm value and profitability.
III. Ownership Structure of Banks in Nigeria
Historically, the Nigerian banking industry has played host to banks having different ownership structures. These include banks having different compositions of ownership (foreign banks, indigenous banks, state banks and private banks) and banks having different spreads of ownership (quoted banks and non-quoted banks).
The first bank that was established in colonial Nigeria, the African Banking Corporation (which later metamorphosed into the Bank of British West Africa (BBWA)), was a foreign bank (Anyanwaokoro, 2001 ). In 1899 a second foreign bank was established. All these foreign banks that were then in existence in the Nigerian colony were, in the main, established to service foreign commercial interests and oil the trade mechanism between Nigeria and its colonial masters; and were thus not interested in developing new markets and clients. Given the foreign commercial interest focus of these banks, it was not surprising that they established operations in localities where British commercial interests predominated.
The inability of these banks to cultivate the indigenous populations led to the establishment of indigenous banks.
The first indigenous bank in Nigeria (Industrial and Commercial Bank) was founded in 1929, "a time when banking was effectively unregulated and entry unrestricted" (Brownbridge, 2005) . This bank was however short-lived and went into liquidation in 1930. Indeed the period between 1947 and 1952 has been described as the era of indigenous banking boom, with the registration of 185 indigenous banks, although most of them did not actually commence operations. Most of the banks that did start operating collapsed within a few years due to a combination of mismanagement, insider lending and inadequate capitalization (Brownbridge, 2005) . The advent of the 1952 Banking Ordinance also ensured that many of the surviving indigenous banks at the time were short lived (Uche and Ehikwe, 2001 ).
The introduction of the ordinance, which for the first time in Nigeria imposed entry conditions for banks such as minimum capital requirements, and the loss of public confidence induced by the failure of local banks, brought the indigenous banking boom to an end by the mid 1950s (Nwankwo, 1980) . Only four indigenous banks survived until independence in 1960; and their survival was solely due to substantial financial support from the regional governments then in existence (Brownbridge, 2005) . This marked the beginning of state government (then known as 'regional government') participation in banking. To break the monopoly power and discriminatory practices of the expatriate banks.
(ii) To give financial assistance to indigenous banks. General Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, argued that the aim of such government acquisition was for the government to get intimately involved in commercial banking activities in order to guide them to operate to the maximum benefit of the economy.
By 1976, a new military government had recognized that the problems that the Nigerian financial system faced could not be solved by government holding of 40 per cent equity in the leading expatriate banks. This resulted in the raising of government equity in foreign banks to 60 per cent under the second phase of the indigenization exercise (Anyanwaokoro, 1996) . This marked the beginning of full-fledged federal government banks. With this development, there were no more foreign banks in Nigeria. The foreign banks operating in Nigeria at the time either became state or non-state indigenous banks. 
IV. The Data
Data employed for the purpose of this study were elicited from 478 financial statements The banks and their data descriptions are presented in Table 1 ; while ROTA summary statistics are presented in Table 2 .
V. Empirical Estimations
To empirically analyze the relationship between ownership structure and bank profitability in Nigeria, data obtained from classified bank groups (based on the composition and spread of their ownership) were analyzed. Two statistical methods were employed in the empirical estimations. The first statistical method is regression analysis; and a predicted model was adopted for this purpose. In this model, regression estimates were derived using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method explained by Loveday (1969 ), Loveday (1980 , Koutsoyiannis (2003) and Greene (2004) . Least squares estimates are the most reliable regression estimates because of their general quality of minimum bias and variance.
The second statistical method is the Student's T-test, used to statistically determine the existence or inexistence of a significant difference between two datasets (Egbule and Okobia, 1998 To ascertain whether ownership structure had a significant impact on bank profitability in Nigeria within the 1989-2004 period, Equation (Eq.) 1 was adopted for use in the empirical estimations. The regression of variables in the equation was conducted electronically via SPSS.
The overall aim of the estimation was to determine whether or not each δ is significant; and a significance limit of 5 per cent was adopted for this purpose. and the estimation results indicate that all of them are insignificant at the 5 per cent significance limit (i.e. they may be significant only if the significance limit is expanded, culminating in adverse effects on the results' reliability). Therefore, the current results at the 5 per cent significance limit reliably imply that ownership structure had no significant impact on bank profitability in Nigeria within the 1989-2004 period.
B. Student's T-test
To verify the authenticity of the results and, by implication, the conclusion drawn through the predicted regression model statistical tests, the student's t-test was adopted for use in the empirical estimations. The tests were conducted electronically via SPSS. The overall aim of the estimation was to determine the existence or inexistence of significant differences between the profitability of banks having different ownership structures; and the 5 per cent significance level was adopted for this purpose. 
VI. Conclusion
Based on the principal finding of this study that ownership structure has had no significant impact on bank profitability in Nigeria, it is clear that the current attempt by the CBN to manipulate the composition of bank ownership in Nigeria in order to enhance component and systemic profitability and efficiency, evident through its December 2007 ultimatum for the phasing out of state banks from the Nigerian banking industry, is completely inappropriate. Rather, the true causes of bank distress and failure in Nigeria should be ascertained and appropriate remedies and preventive measures fully implemented.
At the moment, the CBN should be more concerned about maintaining a healthy operating environment for all banks, regardless of the composition and / or spread of their ownership, and ensuring full compliance by banks to laid-down statutes and regulations. 
